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ABSTRACT 
The study utilizes the multivariate regression techniques to investigate the role of 
political behavior; power structure (at the micro level) and socio economic development 
(macro level) in the transition and consolidation of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa. 
In the analysis, political behavior, defined as the acceptance of political elites to 
accommodate divergent views, is the most significant predictor of democracy in the 
region. Socio economic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
consolidation of democracy in the region. In conclusion, I argue that Sub Saharan African 
nations must pursue both political and economic liberalization which entails the creation 
of a business elite that is separate from the political elites in order to consolidate the 
democratic gains achieved in the past decade.    
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 “The next challenge for the analysis of democratic transitions is to create an organic structure that 
combines the modernization and political agent theses. One research strategy to tackle this challenge is to 
formalize the behavior of the actors and the change of the politico-economic structures as jointly evolving” 
(Kugler and Feng, 144). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW 
      At the national level, the adoption of democratic rule provides the population with the ability 
to replace their government without bloodshed. It empowers the people to effect critical choices 
and provides them with access to the political decision-making process and economic prosperity. 
The complex relationship between the forms of government, economic development and 
underlying political and cultural values has been the subject of scholarly research for a long time. 
In recent years this relationship has attracted the attention of policymakers as there is a growing 
awareness that problems of governance, public policy and economic performance are 
interconnected. As a result of this, multilateral institutions, western aid providers, and 
governments in many countries have placed the promotion of good governance on their policy 
agenda (Pei 2003:1).  
      Because of Sub-Sahara Africa’s poverty, observers who perceive economic progress as 
logically and chronologically superordinate to political pluralism see the process of restoring 
political legitimacy as anomalous. In Sub-Sahara Africa, “predatory authoritarianism has been a 
central cause of the region’s economic underdevelopment- not its handmaiden like in a few Asian 
countries. Correspondingly, political pluralism is necessary but not sufficient for African 
economic recovery and not a luxury to be postponed until middle-income Nirvana is achieved” 
(McFerson 1992:241). 
       During the 1990s, a number of scholars began challenging the ‘no preconditions’ line, with 
analyses of the roles that economic wealth, institutional legacies, social class, and other structural 
factors play in attempted democratic transitions (Carothers 2002:16).  The concern of this study is 
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to investigate the relationship between economic development, structure of power distribution 
and political actors’ behavior on one hand and democracy on the other hand in a “transition 
period”. The central question we address is how does economic development, the structure of 
power and political actors’ behavior jointly affect, and be affected by, the prospects of a 
democratic transition and consolidation. We apply the insights from our findings to the Sub 
Saharan Africa development experience in the 1990s. I seek to investigate whether there is a 
relationship between economic development, power distribution and political actors’ behavior on 
one hand and transitional democracy. In this study I hold the position that Sub-Saharan Africa is 
still in transition to democracy. Transitional democracy in this study is considered as a continuous 
process that culminates in the consolidation of democratic practices in the particular countries.  
       The analysis assesses the claims of both modernization theory and political agent thesis using 
contemporary empirical evidence from Sub-Sahara Africa. To arrive at the conclusions it 
considers the claims of both theories by regressing their indicators in a series of statistical 
applications. Second, it operationalizes various variables and democracy using various indicators 
in an effort to test the generalizations about the relationship that are drawn from global 
comparisons. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for 
democracy in Sub-Sahara Africa and for the theories in general. The statistical analysis indicates 
that political behavior is the most significant predictor of the level of democracy in a nation. 
Economic development and the structure of power, on the other hand are necessary but not 
sufficient factors affecting the level of democracy in the countries studied.  
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
      Authoritarian leaders and single party regimes of all shades came under great pressures 
between 1990 and 1993 to liberalize and permit more participation in the political process. This 
transformation, what Samuel Huntington described as the ‘third wave’ of democratization, 
stemmed from sustained efforts by domestic political forces, albeit assisted by a variety of 
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demanded requirements from international financial institutions and industrialized countries, as 
well as by the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Makinda 1996:556 ). 
       During the 1980’s, an active array of governmental, quasi-governmental, and non 
governmental organizations devoted to promoting democracy abroad sprang into being. The 
pressures for reform were coupled with references to four principal issues: human rights, 
responsible and accountable governments, an end to corruption, and strong public institutions. 
This drive for political liberalization came in the wake of similar efforts by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote structural change. Thus Sub-Sahara Africa has 
faced dual fundamental political and economic reforms in the 1990s. Political and economic 
reforms have symbolized efforts by African regimes to do something to improve their own 
conditions, and the West has occasionally withheld assistance to states in which these measures 
have not been implemented as agreed. 
      Although democracy is becoming the prevalent form of government, we seek to understand 
the underlying domestic dynamics that cause the transformation from authoritarian to democratic 
systems of government. Today most sub-Saharan African countries are considered to be 
somewhere in between outright dictatorship and well established liberal democracy. “Multi-party 
systems have emerged all over the continent. Much less clear, however, is the extent to which 
these countries are progressing towards democratic consolidation, by which democratic norms are 
institutionalized and routinized by the political system” (Van der Walle 2000:6). Why do 
countries decide to head toward democracy? Why do democracies fail to consolidate themselves? 
Will today’s transformations be reversed or obliterated? What is the status of democracy in sub-
Sahara Africa today? 
      A decade after the initiation of these reforms, we seek to understand the performance of 
African regimes in the process of democratization and what factors may lead to consolidation of 
democratic practices. Much of the optimism of the early 1990s has faded (Carothers 2002:4; Van 
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de Walle2000:7; Makinda 1996:572), are there prospects for the consolidation of democratic 
practices? 
1.3 RATIONALE 
     My interest in this study is motivated by my personal experiences and expectations. In 1990 
the clamor for political changes began in Kenya. Riots in the country especially in the capital city, 
Nairobi were numerous and often very violent. This helped me gain awareness about the political 
problems in the country and I developed an activist stance. In 1992, I joined University of Nairobi 
to pursue a degree in Social Sciences. University students were at the forefront of this activism, 
aided by the lumpen proletariat, I actively participated in what was termed the ‘second liberation’. 
Later in 1992, the government of Daniel Arap Moi succumbed to local and international pressure 
and legalized multipartyism. Subsequent years have seen a drive for consolidation of the 
democratic reforms. This culminated with the start of the process of comprehensive constitutional 
reforms in 2000. Today there is a different government that took over power in 2003. Our 
expectations on the political reforms that the government would initiate have not been met; 
leading to question what is needed for democracy to consolidate in sub-Saharan Africa. 
      I also take up the challenge of Jacek Kulger and Yi Feng (Explaining and Modeling 
Democratic Transitions, 1999) to create a model that seeks to investigate the dynamics of the 
transition period to democracy and its prospects for consolidation of democracy. This is 
especially important since today there are growing fears among scholars that the political reforms 
in Sub Saharan Africa during the early 1990s may begin to be taken away and some nations may 
slide back to authoritarian regimes. According to various scholars, African countries lie between 
outright dictatorship and established liberal democracy. The challenge is to keep the 
democratization process moving in the right direction and fast enough to become irreversible 
before the populace become disillusioned. We cannot predict how much time is necessary or 
available for a successful transition but we can certainly seek to establish the conditions necessary 
for a successful transition.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
       Historical studies suggest that modern democracies can occur only under certain conditions 
of capital industrialization. Karl Marx identified the bourgeoisie as the major force behind the 
emergence of democracy. He argued that the capitalist class used parliamentary systems and 
democratic mechanisms to capture the control of the state from the traditional elite. Max Weber 
marked the importance of Protestantism in the development of western democracies. He 
considered individualism and a sense of individual responsibility, inherent in the Protestant ethic, 
as the major conditions for the development of burgher classes and a democratic political culture. 
He argued strongly that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which 
set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another country 
       Arat (1988:21) argues that “the sociology of knowledge, which emphasizes the influence of 
structure and organizational setting on the development of attitudes and behaviors, compels us to 
direct our attention to the structural basis of developing such a culture or personality. In this 
regard, aspects of modernization appear to be the common explanatory factors used in the 
analysis of democracy.” Some scholars (Arat, Landman) argue that the variables of 
modernization do not sufficiently explain the emergence of democracy in the Third World. 
      According to Van de Walle, the spread of the “third wave” of democratization to Africa in the 
early 1990s represented the most significant political change in the continent since the 
independence period three decades before. Throughout the continent, significant political 
liberalization resulted in the emergence of a free press, opposition parties, independent unions 
and a multitude of civic organizations autonomous from the state. In 29 out of 47 states in the 
region, the first multi-party elections were held between 1990 and 1994. When the wave of 
democratization began some academicians were pessimistic about its prospects because of the 
common assumption that democratization would increase societal pressures on governmental 
decision making. “New democratic governments face exceptionally strong distributive pressures, 
both from groups reentering the political arena after long periods of repression and from after 
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long periods of repression and from established interests demanding reassurance” (Van de Wall 
2000:3) This suggests that the democratization process represented a sharp historical 
discontinuity in the mode of governance. 
      Leslie Armijo (2001) argues that there are three observations about transitions to democracy. 
First, it I harder for a country to become democratic than to maintain preexisting democracy. 
Adam Przeworski (Armijo 2001:21) notes that the rational calculations made by all political 
actors must suggest to them that the payoffs expected from playing the democratic game, over the 
medium run, will be greater than those anticipated from subverting democracy. Second, 
heightened economic insecurity usually is not auspicious for a successful democratic transition. 
Thirdly, the process of democratization may be conceived of as typically including three stages: 
political liberalization (loosening of overt authoritarian controls); formal transition to democracy 
(when country adopts new laws and procedures marking an official, legal transition to democratic 
rules of the game); and democratic consolidation (internalization and normative acceptance of the 
new democratic procedures by all the major political actors.) 
      The political scene in Sub-Saharan Africa was marked by authoritarian regimes and structured 
around the ‘patron-client” structure. Van de Walle (2000:4) uses the term neopatrimonalism to 
indicate that most African states are hybrid regimes, in which patrimonial practices co-exist with 
modern bureaucracy.” Outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal 
system, with a clear distinction between the public and the private realm, with written laws and a 
constitutional order. However, this official order is often subverted by a patrimonial logic, in 
which office holders’ almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own uses and 
political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including patronage, various forms of 
rent seeking and prebendalism. These regimes are highly presidential, in the sense that power is 
centralized around a single individual, with ultimate control over most clientelist networks. The 
president personally exerts discretionary power over a big share of the state’s resources.  The 
public office is treated as a personal grant from the leader and the beneficiary is expected to 
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exploit the ‘rent’ potential of the office and reciprocates by giving the ruler absolute loyalty and 
share of the ‘rent’. He, in turn, subcontracts the granting of subordinate prebends with overall 
enforcement provided by the army (McFerson 1992:243).   
       According to Kandeh (1999: 349) the role of politicians or the political class in creating the 
conditions that allow subalterns to usurp power and terrorize society cannot be overstated. As a 
primary instrument of class formation, the state in Africa lacks relative autonomy and is highly 
amendable to the interests of political incumbents. “Formative ruling class functionality describes 
the capacity of states to create conditions and pursue policies that privilege the accumulation of 
wealth by ruling elites” (Kandeh 1999: 351). Jean-Paul Azam (2002) argues that a credible 
redistribution system that prevents the risk of civil war by ethnic groups by determining the share 
of state bounty that each group demands lies at the heart of the organization of the African 
organization. “ The ‘triangular predation game’, whereby the village predates on its own 
migrants, who in turn prey the state, and push it to extract as much as possible from the villagers 
creates the links that hold the African society together” ( Azam 2002: 1). 
        “Reproductive ruling class functionality” refers to the capacity of states to successfully 
define, embody and project the interests of the ruling class as universal and legitimate. According 
to Azam (2002:5), the different ethno-regional groups send ‘delegates’ to the capital city where, 
beside the high and regular incomes, the ‘delegates’ do ensure the political participation of their 
group. Thus the political regimes are steeped in corruption, opportunism, cronyism and 
sycophancy. Therefore the challenge of the transition to constitutional democracy must herald a 
break from the institutional and elite practices of the past. 
       Control of, and access to public offices and resources determine the social location of the 
elites. The ‘delegates’ who fall out of favor seek to gain access to the state resources by either 
waging a civil war or leading the opposition parties in the country. (Carothers 2002:16)But while 
state power is materially transformative for ruling elites, the corruption and repression that attend 
its exercise often preclude the construction of legitimate political institutions. Political elites 
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cause the dysfunctional states in sub-Saharan Africa and therefore a change in their predatory 
behavior indicates a ‘real’ transition to democracy. Policy failures do not represent a major threat 
to the political survival of the leadership because the institutional setup of these systems provides 
ample private benefits to essential backers (de Mesquita et al 1999:160). Unless the question of 
politicians exploiting primordial ties is addressed, the future of multi-partyism in Africa will 
remain uncertain (Makinda 1996:570). According to Mbaku (2003:18), this state of affairs was 
caused by two developments: statism and single party rule. First, at independence the 
development model emphasized government control of resource allocation, minimized the 
functions of the market, and granted significant power to intervene in private exchange, as well as 
to own and control productive resources (statism). Secondly, one party rule was chosen as the 
means to effectively manage ethnic diversity through a strong central government that 
represented ‘all streams of opinions and societal groups.’  
       The rent seeking motivations do not disappear with democratization; one set of crony 
businessmen is simply replaced by another set. The changes did have an impact on the process of 
elite accommodation. Previously the leaders built broad elite coalitions to include all ethnic 
groups. With regular elections, the leaders build a multi-ethnic coalition that can guarantee them 
victory without having to include all ethnic groups in the country (Makinda 1996:570; Van de 
Walle 2000:14 Carothers 2002:12) De Mesquita et al (1999:152) argue that “the larger the 
winning coalition in a country, the thinner must be spread the private goods that are available 
with which to purchase political loyalty”. The diagram below illustrates the underlying workings 
of the patron client system. The second diagram is modeled on a dining table. The President 
serves at the head of the table and the ‘meal’ is the state resources. Those invited to the table gain 
access to the resources including state contracts, influential jobs, and protection to misappropriate 
the resources. The closer one sits to the president, the more power one has in the country. The 
presidents, at whose discretion it is, to make invitations on occasions drop some members from 
the dining elites (‘dumped elites’). With limited access to the state resources, these dumped elites 
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are highly affected economically by the consequences of this action. They then invite others on 
the ‘waiting list’ usually the subordinate elites to replace the ‘dumped’ elites. The presidents 
usually hold on to power by ensuring that the elites continuously pledge loyalty to ensure their 
continued presence on the ‘table’. The ‘dumped’ elites are the prime movers of the opposition 
parties in the region. They are joined by the undecided opportunists to seek to change the regime 
and therefore partake of the ‘national cake’. Therefore regime changes do not signal a change in 
the rent seeking motivations but a mere replacement of one set of cronies with another.      
Illustrations of the Patron Client structure 
STATE
“PRESIDENT”
ELITES VILLAGE
SUBORDINATE 
ELITES
LOYALTY
JOBS, RESOURCES
DEV. PROJECTS, CASH
HANDOUTS
HIGH SALARIES
CORRUPTION
MISAPPROPRIATION OF 
RESOURCES
DONOR AID
LOYALTY
POLICIES?
ANONYMOUS PREDATION
 
 16
President
State resources
Waiting list Undecided opportunists
(Surbodinate Elites)
Dumped 
Elites
(Opposition 
Leaders)  
 
        According to Armijo (2001:22), the problem with third world regimes is that they get 
‘stuck’ between the formal transition to democracy and the democratic consolidation stages. Thus 
the democratization is considered illiberal. Some observers have described the situation in Africa 
as the ‘fallacy of electoralism’ the notion that these countries hold regular elections which 
constitute meaningful political exercises in giving citizens meaningful choices over the 
distribution of power and resources. 
          According to Carothers (2002: 5-9) the transition paradigm has five core assumptions: any 
country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition to 
democracy, democracy tends to unfold in a sequence of stages, the determinative importance of 
elections, the underlying structural features of a nation will not be major forces either in the onset 
or outcome of the transition process, and that the transition is based on coherent, functioning 
states.  
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       Carothers argues that many of the countries in the third wave have fallen in between outright 
dictatorship and well established democracy. He categorizes these nations into two categories: 
feckless pluralism and dominant power politics where he states that most sub-Sahara African 
countries fall. He argues that nations in these categories are not in transition to democracy but in 
alternate directions, not way stations to liberal democracy. Thus they are in a state of normality. 
In his analysis, we should discard the notion of transitional democracy and focus on the 
democratic conditions that the countries are faced with today. 
      A theory used to explain transitional democracy is the “Political Agent thesis” which focuses 
on the actions of the political actors. Van de Walle argues that African political systems have 
been characterized by relatively low levels of political participation. He argues that the 
democratization did not create new social coalition because professional associations and interest 
groups are relatively weak. One of the biggest obstacles to liberal democracy in Africa is the 
suspicion and fear with which the leaders view democracy (Makinda 1996:556). 
      According to Feng and Zak (1999:163), as countries develop, the distribution of wealth (or 
income) typically widens and some benefit from the changes. They argue that political rights and 
civil liberties are goods in agents’ consumption sets. The agents thus seek political freedom by 
engaging in political activity which is the “foundation for the development of a civil society” 
(Feng and Zak 1999:164). The political activity is driven by economic or political concerns. Thus 
the role of political agents is paramount in the transition and consolidation of democratic 
practices. 
      Makinda (1996:557) argues that the dominant cultural values of any society, together with its 
ethnic composition, level of education, and economic system, are important determinants of its 
political ideas and institutions. African countries have relatively weak class or interest groups; 
representation is often based on ethnic or religious affiliation. In such societies, political divisions 
tend to be vertical, since members of an ethnic group often band together irrespective of their 
social status. “In the absence of effective lower class demands for political participation, political 
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reforms may cease with partial liberalization of overt authoritarian controls on middle class civil 
liberties, stopping well short of full democratization (Armijo 2001:38) 
      According to Makinda (1996:557) historical factors (colonialism), economic growth, 
technological infrastructure, and the cultural dimension of poverty, underdevelopment, injustice 
and authoritarianism are factors that affect liberal democracy in Africa.  He further argues that 
“most African societies do not have a tradition of liberal democracy, and those leaders who took 
power after independence destroyed whatever checks and balances their constitutions contained” 
(Makinda 1996:557). The position that historical precedence to democracy affects the chances of 
democratic transition and consolidation is also upheld by Armijo (2001:23), Gleditsch (35), and 
many other scholars. Makinda asserts that democracy cannot take root in Africa because people 
are unfamiliar with the structures through which their can express their decisions. He states, “It is 
difficult to see how a society can exact accountability from its political leaders and civil servants 
if its population cannot clearly differentiate public from private issues, and is not well informed” 
(Makinda 1996: 558). Bratton and Mattes (2001:120) argue that many Africans interpret 
democracy in universal terms, and value it intrinsically as well as instrumentally; their 
understanding of democratic principles is extremely vague.  
      Zielinski (1999) argues that the military plays a critical role in the transition process. He 
argues that transition to and consolidation of democracy is a bargaining situation between the 
reformers in the government and the moderates in the opposition  over the extent of political 
change, with the reformers attempting to preserve as much power as possible and the moderates 
trying to get as close to democracy as they can. Violence occurs in this period according to 
Zielinski when the reformers are misinformed about the military position on the changes. He 
argues that where the military’s stated goals are clearly disseminated there are less chances of 
violence and also that the support by the military for democratic changes is crucial in attaining the 
changes.   
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     Widner argues that courts play a big role in the consolidation of democracy particularly in a 
post conflict society. She states “ in post conflict transitions, courts can enhance the levels of 
public contestation and inclusiveness of participation in political processes, as well as help to 
implement democracy as a set of everyday practices” (Widner 2001:72). She argues that courts in 
Africa have leveled the playing field among contenders for public power by upholding rules that 
support free and fair elections. However this influence is not always straightforward. She argues 
that courts and law are likely to become more effective in Africa after a ‘critical juncture’, a 
confluence of events that causes the executive to delegate more authority to the courts and 
changes people’s willingness to take cases to judges for resolution.   
       The role of interdependence and interaction across orders in world politics is also emphasized 
as a contributing factor towards the transition and consolidation of democracy. Kristian Gleditsch 
asserts that international aspects such as the [political structures in proximate states and regional 
threats that states face strongly influence the likelihood that a country will be democratic and 
experience transitions. She states that “the distribution of authority characteristics is not 
independent between countries, but displays strong evidence of patterns of diffusion” (Gleditsch, 
35). Therefore the distribution of democracy is not independent among countries, rather 
international factors and processes, especially at the regional level influence the likelihood that a 
country will become or remain democratic. 
       A closely related factor that leads to democratic transition and consolidation is the external 
pressure (Makinda 1996:562; Van de Walle 2000:4; McPherson 1992:244; Carothers 2002:6) 
Policy makers in Europe and North America promoted democracy as the panacea for Africa’s 
political and economic problems, while non-governmental organizations also championed similar 
reforms. For example, “ it is only after aid donors and the World Bank had made further 
assistance contingent on substantive political and economic reforms that President Moi (of 
Kenya) agreed to a multi-party system” (Makinda1996:566).  Fayissa and El-Kaissy (1999, 46) 
argue that foreign aid is positively associated with economic growth which improves political and 
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civil liberties. However Armijo (2001:36) argues that foreign investment does not lead to 
democratic process. This direction according to her depends on shifts in the distribution of locally 
relevant political resources. Makinda (1996:572) asserts that it may be useful to link some types 
of foreign assistance to political and economic liberalization and also promote social justice. 
      Feng and Zak assert that economic development changes the behavior and attitudes of the 
elites. They argue that as development continues, wealth increases and educational levels of some 
segments of the population rise causing social heterogeneity to grow. As a result individuals 
begin to lose their social identification and focus on individual and family concerns. The 
increased heterogeneity that accompanies development strains the social contract between the 
autocratic ruler and his citizens. Continuing apace with development in autocracies, the social 
order begins to deteriorate as the citizenry ‘outgrows’ a repressive regime. According to Van de 
Walle (2000:6), by late 1980s many regimes in Africa were undergoing a legitimacy crisis 
brought about by their dismal economic performance and worsening economic conditions. 
Restive populations were increasingly willing to contest central state power through civic 
organizations.     
      This argument is founded on the tenets of the Modernization theory.  Modernization theory 
claims that as countries save and invest at appropriate levels that help enhance their infrastructure 
and social institutions, liberal democratic institutions will flourish as a natural response to the 
functional imperatives of society, and supply the best form of government. The development of 
social institutions enhances the level of education of the population, improves its social and 
spatial mobility, and promotes the political culture that supports liberal democratic institutions.   
        Lipset (1959:69) argues that in dealing with democracy, one must be able to point a set of 
conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and has become stabilized because 
of certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-
maintaining processes. He suggested a complex of interrelated social and economic conditions as 
prerequisites for political democracy.  
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       The relationship between economic development and democracy has occupied the attention 
of many scholars. Arat (1988:22) argues that Lipset initiated a new trend in which the focus was 
shifted from individual to system characteristics. “Lipset’s argument, through its expansion by 
subsequent scholars, started a discussion about the impact of socioeconomic development on 
political democracy” (Arat 1988:22). 
 “The predominant finding of quantitative comparative research on the correlates of democracy is 
that there is a stable positive relationship between socio-economic development and democracy. 
The weak version of this argument claims that increased levels of economic development are 
associated with democracy while the strong version suggests that economic development actually 
causes democracy” (Landman 1999:607) Both arguments fall within the broader modernization 
theory  which assumes that there is a universal process of socio-economic development of which 
democracy is but the final stage. A common reason given for this connection is that increasing 
economic benefits for the masses intensify demands for the political benefits of democracy. 
Economic development can spread authority and democratic aspirations among a variety of 
people, thus fostering democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994:903, Feng and Zak 
1999:162).According to Huntington; economic development is the major underlying factor 
generating the wave of democratic transitions.  
      Lipset suggested a positive linear relationship between the levels of socioeconomic 
development and democratic development. His conclusion was that “economic development 
involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and s steady increase in the 
overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy, it is a mark of efficiency 
of the total system” (Lipset 1959:71). He further argued that “the stability of a given democratic 
system depends not only on the system’s efficiency in modernization, but also upon effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the political systems” (Lipset 1959:72,). Therefore as Arat observes, Lipset was 
arguing for socioeconomic development as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for the 
establishment and/or maintenance of a democratic political system (Arat 1988:22).   
 22
       Education is considered as an important factor in creating the attitudes and values for a 
participant culture. Using survey data from Middle Eastern countries, Lerner identified 
urbanization, education and media growth (or communication) as the essential factors for the 
process of democratic development. He considered urbanization to be a factor stimulating 
education, which in turn accelerates media growth and eventually democratic development. 
Modernization theory takes an evolutionary element. It suggests that, at least in the lower stages 
of economic development, increases in economic development level lead to increases in the level 
of democracy. This contention has dominated the discussions of political democracy.  According 
to Arat (1988:23) this contention ought to be effectively challenged.  Deane Neubauer and Robert 
Jackman challenged the linearity of the relationship between economic development and 
democracy in a system. They argue that there is no significant relationship between the two 
properties for the highly developed countries. Arat (1988:33) in his analysis states that 
“democracy is not a one way ladder that countries climb as their economy and social structures 
develop even for the less developed countries”. Socioeconomic development is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of democratic development. 
      Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994:907) argue that “economic development substantially 
improves a nation’s democratic prospects. However, the full magnitude of that effect depends on 
the location of the nation in the world system. As a nation moves from the core the effect 
diminishes. Even in the periphery, however, the effect remains statistically and substantively 
significant.”  
      Feng and Zak argue that the primary determinants affecting the timing of democratic 
transitions are per capita income (also Goldsmith 1997), the distribution of wealth, educational 
levels (also Bratton and Mattes 2001:117), and the strength of preferences for political rights and 
civil liberties. They argue that transitions to democracy are less likely when the level of 
development is low, income inequality is high, and citizens are poorly educated. In Africa, 
according to Feng and Zak (1999:174), the biggest obstacle to democratic transition is lack of 
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economic development. The poor are less likely to demand for political changes; rather they seek 
to attain their basic needs. Makinda (1996:568) states that “people are more interested in finding 
out how to cope with daily hardships than in ensuring that their governments are accountable.” 
This is the common criticism forwarded by critics of the structural adjustment programs required 
by the IMF and the World Bank. The reforms have had enormous social and economic pains on 
the majority of the people hence ultimately harming political stability. 
       There are however many criticisms of the modernization theory. Most objections focus on its 
deterministic and teleological quality since it assumes that all countries that achieve high levels of 
economic development necessarily achieve democracy. Huntington argues that without proper 
political institutionalization, socio-economic development could actually lead to political 
instability. It is also criticized as ethnocentric because it is based on patterns observed in the 
advanced industrial nations of Europe and North America (Armijo 2001:34). It is argued that in 
Latin America, economic growth did not lead to democratization, rather the reverse occurred; 
there was an increase in authoritarian regimes. It is also ‘a historical’ since it posits a universal 
trajectory for all nations thus ignoring the impact of colonization and decolonization. According 
to Landman, statistical models that test the theory are done on a global, cross-national level, 
whose framework achieves great variance due to a large number of observations. Rarely do these 
models focus on a particular region. He tested the claims of modernization on Latin America and 
states that there are not applicable in the region. Landman however argues that economic 
development and democracy are largely independent processes, whose statistical relationship may 
hold for the world but not for the Latin America context.   
      Armijo, like many political scientists, is skeptical about the direct relationship between 
economic development and democracy. She states, “there is no direct relationship between 
economic growth, on one hand, and the transition to or consolidation of procedural political 
democracy, on the other hand” (Armijo 2001:34). 
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      Landman states that the simple causal link between economic development and democracy, 
which ignores the complex intervening political factors, can ultimately threaten the process of 
democratic consolidation if citizens if the citizens expect too much of the new democracy. Once 
democracy is established, expectations rise for the goods of economic development to be 
distributed more fairly. Moreover, lack of economic performance in the new democratic period 
may lead to a certain nostalgia for earlier periods of economic prosperity under conditions of non-
democratic rule.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
       Two perspectives prevail in most literature on some determinants of democratic transitions. 
At the macro level, the modernization theory analyzes the economic and social structures that 
shape the incentives of the society. At the micro level, the political agent thesis addresses the 
preferences and interactions among the political agents. This study incorporates both theories into 
a single model. 
3.1 THEORIES AND CONCEPTS 
Socio-Economic Development 
      In discussing the influence of socio economic development on democratization, 
modernization theory has been frequently used although it is rarely mentioned today in the 
political science field. The basic assumption of the modernization theory is that developing 
countries are on the way towards an ideal-type developmentalist model. Max Weber argued that 
cultural values, beliefs and interests distinguish two types of human beings, traditional and 
modern with the latter amenable to change and confident on the ability to bring the change 
around. According to Rostow (The Stages of Economic Growth), the development of all societies 
lies in five stages, which develop consecutively: (i) the traditional society, developed with limited 
production functions; (ii) the preconditions for the take-off, embracing societies in a transition 
process; (iii) the take-off, where growth becomes the normal condition in a society: (iv) the drive 
to maturity, when modern technology expands over the whole front of the economic, social and 
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political activities; and finally (v) the age of high mass-consumption, in which a large number of 
persons gain command over consumption, transcending basic food, shelter and clothing. 
Therefore the modernization theory consists of “a gradual differentiation and specialization of 
social structures that culminates in a separation of political structures from other sources and 
makes democracy possible” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 158). It assumes that the process of 
socio-economic development is a progressive accumulation of social changes that ready a society 
to its culmination, democratization (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 158). According to Feng and 
Kulger, modernization theory postulates that development or modernization will lead to 
democracy. According to Lipset, economic development leads to increased education and 
enlarges the middle class which in turn makes the society more receptive to democratic political 
tolerance. Therefore in the study, the following variables are utilized to measure socio economic 
development: urbanization, technology, education, life expectancy, and unemployment.   
Political Agent Theory 
      This thesis focuses on strategic interactions among political actors and its proponents argue 
that democratization is an outcome of actions, not just conditions. They treat democratic 
transitions as a multistage process characterized by the erosion and collapse of authoritarian rule, 
followed by a democratic transition and consolidation. This theory emphasizes the uncertainty by 
both the status quo and the opposition. It thus focuses on the interactions between the political 
elites through their behavior and the power structure in the society. Przeworski (Armijo 2001:21) 
argues that democracy is about institutionalized uncertainty and continuous compromise; each 
player’s rational calculation must lead to the conclusion that mutual compromise is superior to 
no-holds-barrel conflict, which holds out the possibility of total victory, but also of total defeat. 
Therefore democracy is entrenched by the rational choices of the political actors. 
Democracy 
The definition of democracy has evolved over the years. Cardoso (2001:9) argues that democracy 
does not have a pre-established model, a recipe to be copied by all nations. Yet, he argues, there 
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are set of values that are fundamental and which may not be negotiated away.  Lipset (71) defines 
democracy “as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing 
the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal 
decision making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the 
population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative 
contenders for political office.” Armijo defines democracy as procedural political democracy. 
Here democracy is defined by wide access (all adult citizens have the vote, with no restrictions on 
either citizenship or voting imposed by property ownership, race, ethnicity, literacy, or other 
demographic or economic criteria) and specified, universalistic procedures including freedom of 
speech and organization, multiple political parties and candidates, secret ballots, fixed terms of 
office, and limited authority of elected officials, who themselves are subject to the law of the 
land. This definition she adds assumes that neither minimums of economic security nor economic 
equality are either necessary or sufficient for democratic government. Implicitly it assumes that 
the one person, one vote rule, combined with the legal imperative of equality before the law, is 
sufficient to ensure justice in the society. Arat (1988:24) developed a scale of democracy that 
focused on availability of political participation, competitiveness and civil liberties.    
      Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman constructed a Database of Liberal Democratic 
Performance that includes eight core values of liberal democratic government. The values 
combine the individual experience of democracy (rule of law) which includes political rights, 
civil rights, minority rights and property rights, and institutional efficacy of democratic 
government (sovereignty of the people) which include accountability, constraint, representation, 
and participation. They argue that “these rights and the rule of law are important guarantees of 
individual freedoms and protections, and so help to deliver the substance of democracy to the 
citizenry at large. The institutional values protect the rule of law by making government 
accountable to the people”. In this study, I utilize the variables in the Database of Liberal 
Democracy because it, in my assessment has encompasses all the core attributes of democracy. 
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The study therefore utilizes the procedural definition while encompassing the ability of the largest 
possible part of the population to influence societal decisions.  Thus in this study democracy is 
not treated as either present or not, but we can derive a scale to measure the level of democracy in 
particular nations. We can also statistically test how the independent variables affect the various 
aspects of democracy.   
Economic Development 
      “The definition of what constitutes economic development has evolved over the years from 
simple statements about economic growth (percentage change in GDP and per capita levels of 
GDP), to the distribution of income and employment, to the full realization of the social and 
economic rights of citizenship” (Landman 1999:611) Despite these newer definitions, the concept 
continues to be thought of in terms of economic performance, and empirically, it continues to be 
operationalized by the real GDP per capita or energy consumption. For the study, economic 
development is operationalized as real GDP growth. The number reached by valuing all the 
productive activity within the country at a specific year's prices. When economic activity of two 
or more time periods is valued at the same year's prices, the resulting figure allows comparison of 
purchasing power over time, since the effects of inflation have been removed by maintaining 
constant prices. GDP or Gross Domestic Product is the value of all the goods and services 
produced in a country. The Nominal Gross Domestic Product measures the value of all the goods 
and services produced expressed in current prices. On the other hand, Real Gross Domestic 
Product measures the value of all the goods and services produced expressed in the prices of 
some base year. 
Power Structure 
This refers to the distribution of power in a country. As discussed in the Literature Review 
section, in Sub-Sahara Africa, the power structure is based on the patron-client system. In the 
study, the variable is measured in terms of the societal structures that are used to sustain the 
clientelist networks. In this regard, the variables used to measure this composite variable are 
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wealth inequalities, strength of opposition parties, ethnicity, corruption, and public sector wages. 
These are some of the factors that have been identified by various scholars (as discussed in the 
literature review) as contributing to the growth and sustenance of the clientelist networks. In the 
analysis, a higher score indicates less presence of these factors and therefore a structure that 
allows a wider part of the population to participate in the political process.  
 Political Behavior 
This focuses on the behavior of the major political actors in a country. This behavior may be 
motivated by political or economic considerations and is mainly confined to the political elites in 
a country. In this study, political behavior is defined as the rational calculations made by all the   
political actors that suggest to them that the payoffs expected from playing the different games 
over medium run will be beneficial to their political, economic and social interests. In this regard, 
the variable is measured in terms of how the expected payoff from playing the democratic game 
benefits them over subverting democracy (Armijo 2001:21). Thus the variables used in the study 
to measure this composite variable: pressure, smooth, corruption, political terror, and press 
freedom reflect acceptance or lack of, accommodating divergent views among both internal 
actors (citizens) and external actors (donor communities). In the analysis, a higher score indicates 
that the political elites are willing to accommodate a larger section of the population in the 
political process.  
Transition  
In this study transition is defined not only as the time frame within which a nation shifts from 
authoritarian rule and embrace democratic practices but as including the entire duration up to the 
time democratic practices are consolidated in a country. Therefore, the position adopted in this 
study is in conflict with Carother’s argument that we should consider the transition paradigm as 
having ended. My argument is that as long as people in a country still clamor for political changes 
in a country that has yet to substantially embrace democratic principles as the guiding principles 
of societal organization, then that country is considered to be in transition. Transitional 
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democracy in this context should be approached from the standpoint of approaching democracy. 
Therefore his argument that the ‘illiberal’ democracies in Africa are not a way station to liberal 
democracy but an end in them is disputed in my argument. The time frame of the changes may be 
long and the excitement of the early 1990s faded leading to skepticism about the future of liberal 
democracy in Africa. The weakness in Africa highlighted by Carothers and other scholars should 
be considered as difficulties faced in the democratization process. But as long as there are people 
determined to achieve democracy in these states then we should consider them as ‘approaching 
democracy’. Therefore, in this context, I uphold Armijo’s (2002:22) argument that, the problem 
with third world regimes is that they get ‘stuck’ between the formal transition to democracy and 
the democratic consolidation stages. 
3.2 THE HYPOTHESIS 
I seek to investigate whether both economic development and power sharing arrangements lead to 
democratic consolidation in countries in transition. If what is suggested by the modernization 
theorists holds, we should find a statistically significant positive relationship between 
socioeconomic development and democracy. Most countries should display increasing levels of 
democracy with increasing levels of socioeconomic development. Also if what is suggested by 
the Political Agent thesis holds, we should find a statistically significant positive relationship 
between a change in political behavior by the elites and a change in the power structure to 
incorporate more players in the political field and democracy. The study therefore seeks to test 
the general hypothesis that there is a significant positive relationship between socio economic 
development, power distribution and political actors’ behavior and transitional democracy. To 
test for these arguments the index scores of democracy are regressed on indicators of 
socioeconomic development, power distribution and political behavior. 
The Specific Hypothesis 
1. There is a relationship between democracy, and economic development, life 
expectancy, urbanization, education, unemployment and technology respectively. 
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2. There is a negative relationship between democracy and corruption. 
3. There is a positive relationship between democracy and accommodative political 
behavior (measured by the composite variable for political behavior). 
4. There is a positive relationship between democracy and distributive power structure 
(measured by the composite variable for power distribution). 
 
4. RESEARCH SETTING 
4.1 SAMPLE 
This is a cross national study; therefore the population is nation states in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
sample size is 20 nation states. The nations included in the sample was determined by the 
following factors, 
· Population- any nation with a population of less than 1 million was not considered. However I 
include Seychelles because of its relatively good economic performance. Based on this factor 7 
nations were dropped: Comoros, Djibouti, Re Union, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and principle, 
and Cape Verde. 
· Civil Wars- any nation involved or recently involved in major civil strife was not considered. 
Therefore 9 nations were dropped: Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Angola, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Sudan, Liberia, and Chad.  
      Of the 34 countries that met the above qualifications, I settled for a sample size of 20 nations 
representing over 50% of the population. To arrive at the 20 specific nations to be included in the 
sample, we further considered the following factors; 
· Colonial Experience- To consider whether former colonial masters influence political 
experience in their former colonies, I divided nations into Anglophone (8), Francophone (6) and 
others (2). 
· Regional Divisions- I seek to include nations from all regions (based on United Nations 
divisions). To achieve equal representation, we allocated places to each region in proportion to 
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their number in the continent. Therefore Eastern and Central Africa has 6, Southern 6, and 
Western 8.   
·Electoral Democracies- I considered only those nations that are listed as electoral democracies in 
the UN Reports and have conducted multi-party elections in the 1990s. The nations are both 
stable and unstable democracies. 
· Data Availability- finally we consider nations where data is available. 
In the end, the following nations are included in the sample; 
1. Botswana (South, Anglophone) 
2. Cameron(West, Francophone) 
3. Cote de Iviore(West, Francophone) 
4. Ethiopia (East, Other) 
5. Gabon(West, Francophone) 
6. Gambia(West, Francophone) 
7. Ghana (West, Anglophone) 
8. Kenya (East, Anglophone) 
9. Madagascar (East, Francophone) 
10. Mali (West, Francophone) 
11. Mauritius(East, Anglophone) 
12. Mozambique(South, Other) 
13. Namibia (South, Other) 
14. Nigeria (West, Anglophone) 
15. Senegal (West, Francophone) 
16. Seychelles(East, Anglophone) 
17. South Africa(South, Other) 
18. Tanzania(East, Anglophone) 
19. Zambia (South, Anglophone) 
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20. Zimbabwe(South, Anglophone) 
4.2 VARIABLES 
The data for this study will be collected from various secondary sources. Below is a table 
indicating the variables, measurement values and the source of data for each variable. 
This is a list of variables to be considered in the study. The variables for democracy (dependent 
variable) are from the Database of Liberal Democratic Performance. This database has twenty 
one indicators of liberal democratic performance. The indicators are divided into eight categories 
comprising institutional values (accountability, representation, constraint, and participation) and 
legal values (political rights, civil rights, property rights, and minority rights). In this study, I will 
consider one indicator for each of the categories. 
1. ELECTION 
         Democratic Value: Accountability 
          Measurement Level: Ordinal 
             Value               Label 
1 Pseudo democracy (state in which there are democratic structures but 
without a real chance for an alternance of power.)  
2 Democracy (state in which there are democratic structures and there is a 
real chance for an alternance of power.)  
          Data Source: www.electionworld.org  
          Justification:  Countries may have limited but still real political space, some political 
contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of democracy. 
Yet one political grouping whether political party, leader, dominates the system in such a way 
that there appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future (Carothers, 
12).      
2. SEATS % of seats for the largest political party 
        Democratic Value: Representation (Competitiveness) 
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         Measurement Level: Interval 
         Data source:  www.electionworld.org (This is a website that provides an archive with all the 
updated information on all elections held in the world) 
 
3.  EXCONST 
        Democratic Value: Constraint 
        Measurement Level: Ordinal 
           Value                                      Label 
1 Unlimited authority (there is no limitations on executive 
authority other than threats of coups or assassination) 
2 Intermediate category 
3 Slight to moderate limitations 
4 Intermediate category 
5 Substantial limitations (executive has more effective 
authority than any accountability group but is subject to 
substantial constraints by them) 
6 Intermediate category 
7 Executive parity or subordination (Accountability groups 
have effective authority equal to or greater than the chief 
executive in more areas of activity) 
        Data Source: Polity IV Dataset (www.cidcm.umd.edu). It refers to the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of the chief executive. The higher the 
score, the more democratic a country is. 
4. PREVOTE- Presidential Vote as % of voting population. 
         Democratic value: Participation 
         Measurement Level: Interval 
         Data Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (Stockholm 
(www.idea.int)       
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         Justification:  The presidential election is the most contested election in Africa because 
whoever is elected affects what happens in the country. Africans are generally more interested in 
the presidential elections than parliamentary elections. A higher turnout represents more 
participation. 
5. POLRIGHTS –Political Rights  
         Democratic Value: Political Rights 
         Measurement Level: Ordinal 
              Value              Label 
1                   free 
                2                   free but factors such as political corruption, violence, foreign and  
                                     military influence, discrimination against minorities may be  
                                     present and weaken the quality of freedom. 
                 3 -5             conditions in 2 above and also lingering royal power, heavy   
                                     military involvement in politics, unfair elections, and one party  
                                     dominance though still enjoy some elements of political rights  
                                     including freedom to organize quasi-political groups, free 
                                     referenda and popular influence on the government. 
6 ruled by military juntas, one party dictatorships, religious  
                     hierarchies or autocrats. Allow only minimal manifestation of  
                     rights. 
7                   political rights absent or virtually non existent. 
 
In the Index, a country is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total 
number of raw points warded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For 
both checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. 1- 2.5 are considered free, 3- 5.5 
partly free, and 5.5- 7 not free. 
         Data Source: www.freedomhouse.org (The Freedom House Index 2003)   
6. CRIGHTS- Civil Rights 
Democratic Value: Civil Rights 
Measurement Level: Ordinal 
    Value             Label 
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1                  free including freedom of expression, assembly, association, 
                    education and religion. Have a generally established and  
                    equitable system of rule of law. 
2                  have deficiencies in three or four aspects of civil liberties, but  
                    relatively free.  
3- 5             Partial compliance with the level of oppression increasing at 
                    every level particularly in censorship, political terror, and  
                    prevention of association. 
     6                  severely restricted rights of expression and association with few 
                         partial rights. 
    7                 virtually no freedom, fear of repression characterizes these 
                       states. 
In the Index, a country is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total 
number of raw points warded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For 
both checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. 1- 2.5 are considered free, 3- 5.5 
partly free, and 5.5- 7 not free. 
 
Data Source: www.freedomhouse.org (The Freedom House Index 2003) 
 7. ECONFREE- Economic Freedom 
             Democratic Value: Index of economic freedom 
              Measurement Level: Ordinal 
                 Value            Label   
                 1                      Very High economic freedom 
                 2                       High economic freedom 
                 3                       moderate economic freedom 
                 4                       low economic freedom 
                 5                       Very low economic freedom 
       Economic freedom is based on an assessment of trade, government intervention, monetary 
policy, foreign investment, banking, wages and price, property rights, regulation, and black 
market.  
          Data Source: Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal, Index of Economic Freedom 2003. 
(www.heritage.org) 
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   8. WOMEN   % of women in the Lower House of Legislature 
             Democratic Value: Minority Rights 
             Measurement Level: Ratio 
             Data Source: Inter-parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org). I have used the latest dates 
where applicable because election dates differ for all the countries. 
A higher percent of women in the legislature indicates more rights for women in the nation. This 
is especially important in the African context since most African societies are patrimonial 
societies. (Makinda 1996: 570) 
 
The independent variables are derived from the Modernization theory and Political Actors 
Theory. These include: 
1. ECONDEV- Economic Development   
Value: PPP Gross national income Per Capita 2002 
             Measurement Level: Ratio 
PPP is purchasing power parity; an international dollar has the same purchasing power over 
GDP as a dollar has in the United States. 
             Data Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, July 2003, 
(www.worldbank.org)  
2. LIFEEXP- Life Expectancy 2002 
Value: Years 
 Measurement Level: Ratio 
The number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of age specific 
mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child’s life. 
Data Source: United Nations, Human Development Indicators 2003. (www.undp.org) 
3. URBAN- Urbanization 2002 
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Value: % of population living in urban areas 
Measurement Level: Ratio 
Data Source: United Nations, World Report 2003. (www.unfpa.org) 
4. EDUC- Education 2002 
Value: Education Index 
Measurement Level: Ordinal 
The education index measures a country’s relative achievement in both adult literacy and 
combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment. The index measures from 0 
to 1.0 with 1.0 being a perfect score. 
Data Source: United Nations, Human Development Indicators 2003. (www.undp.org) 
Justification: education can uplift the lives of the citizens giving them hope and meaning 
in their lives. A lack of education can cause disillusionment to the youth leading to taking 
up arms (Kandeh 1999: 358). 
5. UNEMPLOY- Unemployment  
Value: Unemployment levels in %. 
 Measurement Level: Ratio 
Data Source: CIA World Fact Book 2003, www.cia.gov 
6. TECH- Technology  
Value: Cellular phones subscribers per 100 inhabitants 2002. 
Measurement Level: Ratio 
Data Source: www.itu.org 
Justification: Cardoso (2001:7) argues that technologies strengthen democratic values, 
transparency and communication between the government and its citizens. 
 For all the variables above, we expect that an increase in each of the variables will lead to an 
increase in democracy in a country except unemployment in which we expect a negative 
relationship.  
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Political behavior 
7. SMOOTH  
Value: Accepted a smooth transition of power 
Measurement Level: Ordinal 
      Value                     Label 
1 Accepted only after violence 
2 accepted with reservations 
3 Accepted  
                Data Source: U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (for 
various years) Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 
8. PRESSURE: 
      Value: External forces 
Measurement Level: Ordinal 
       Value                  Label 
        1                     Extensive external pressure   
        2                     Not extensive external pressure              
        3                     Minimal external pressure  
Data Source: U.S. State Department. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 
Justification: The pressure to democratize exerted by the western donors and their support 
for the ensuring democracies led some to claim that they represented the main motor 
behind democratization (van de Walle, Makinda).  
External pressure is ranked according to the level of threats to discontinue external 
funding by the major multilateral partners to the actual discontinuation of funding. 
9. PRESS FREEDOM 
Value: Freedom of Press Index 2003 
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Measurement Level: Ordinal 
       Value                             Label 
         0- 30                          free media 
         31- 60                        partly free media 
         61- 100                      media not free 
Data Source:  Karlekar, Karin D (Ed). Freedom of Press: A Global Survey of Media 
Independence. (www.freedomhouse.org) 
             Justification: Khan argues that “in the absence of a formidable and officially recognized 
political opposition, the media gradually emerged to fill this democratic space. There emerged an 
overriding desire by the ‘radical left’ within civil society to articulate the ‘voice’ of the 
underprivileged majority to hold the ruling elite accountable. This culminated in the rise of 
radical journalism.” 
10. PTERROR 
         Value: Political Terror Scale 2002. 
          Measurement Level: Ordinal 
                Value                                               Label 
1 No prisoners of conscience, torture and  
                                                   political murders rare. 
2 Limited imprisonment, torture and murders  
                                                                              rare. 
3 Extensive imprisonment, political murders  
                                                     common and unlimited detention accepted. 
4 practices in 3 extended to larger numbers 
5 Terror extended to whole population 
          Data Source:  www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney_docs/pts.xls  
          Justification: This variable measures the extent to which the leaders use force and terror 
against divergent views to maintain power in their countries.  
Structure of power 
11. WEALTH( income inequality) 
Value: Gini Index  
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Measurement Level: Scale 
Data Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, (www.worldbank.org)   
The index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) 
among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received 
against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or 
household. The index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical 
line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. 
A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequalities.   
Justification: When a country has a big gap between the rich and the poor then there is a 
livelihood of less democracy because of rampant inequalities (Feng and Zak 1999:164). 
12. OPPOSITION 
Value: % seats in lower house for the opposition parties. 
 Measurement Level: Scale 
Data Source: www.freedomhouse.org 
             Justification: If the opposition parties hold more than a third of the parliamentary seats 
then they can block any constitutional amendments thus limit the power of the ruling elites to 
change the constitution at will. 
13. ETHNICITY 
                Value: Ethnic Groups- 1 0r 2 ethnic groups form over 50% of the nation’s population.  
                Measurement Level: Ordinal 
                     Value                   Label 
1 Ethnic majority    
2 No Ethnic majority 
                 Data Source: World Fact Book (www.cia.gov) 
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                 Justification: Collier (7) argues that if a society has a single ethnic group which is large 
enough to dominate democratic institutions then democracy itself is not sufficient to reassure 
minorities. He argues that an ethnic diverse society is safer than a homogenous one.   In an 
ethnically divided society the more the ethnic groups the more the prospects for coalitions 
because every group needs the other. 
14. CORRUPT 
                 Value 
                  Measurement Level: Ordinal 
                   Value                       Label 
10 highly clean 
                     0                               highly corrupt  
 Transparency International Index relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt)    
                  Data Source: www.transparency.org (Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2003) 
                  Justification: Jimmy Kandeh (351) argues that “control of, and access to, public 
offices and resources determine the social location of predatory elites. But while state power is 
materially transformative for ruling elites, the corruption and repression that attend its exercise 
often preclude the construction of legitimate political institutions.” Therefore a reduction in 
corruption indicates a change in the structure of power since corruption feeds this power structure 
through the allocation of resources to the political elites. 
15. PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES 
                 Value: Total Central Government Wage Bill as a % of government expenditure (2002) 
                 Measurement Level: Interval 
                Data Source: World Bank, Public Sector Employment and Wage Data by Country, 
(www.worldbank.org) 
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                Justification: Azam (2001:16) argues that high public sector wages and salaries aim at 
fuelling a large flow of remittances between the urban elite group and their fellow ethnic-group 
members, in order to buy support from them. Thus if the wage bill has reduced, it indicates that 
the public sector is less utilized as a means of buying support from the people. 
COMPOSITE VARIABLES  
I have developed composite variables for political behavior, power structure and democracy. The 
democracy variable measures the level of democracy in each country. The Political behavior 
variable measures the extent to which the behaviors of the political agents in particular nations 
accept variations of political thoughts within the society. I have created three categories, namely 
‘non-accommodative’, ‘partially accommodative’, and ‘accommodative’ behavior.  
Behavior – Smooth: with violence= 1; with reservations= 2; and accepted = 3. 
                  - Pressure: Extensive=1; not extensive= 2; and minimal = 3. 
                  - Press Freedom: not free= 1; partly free= 2; and free= 3. 
                  - Polterror: Terror to whole=1; extensive terror=2; No to limited= 3.   
                  - Corruption: 0-4= 1; 5-7= 2; and 8-10= 3. 
 
                      I will assign every nation points based on this scale. The range of scores is 5 – 15 
with low scores of 5- 8 representing little or no accommodating behavior to political pluralism, 9-
12 representing partially accommodative behavior, and 13-15 representing accommodative 
behavior. 
 
Power -Wealth: Gini Index: 70-100= 1; 40-70= 2; and 0-30= 3.  
            - Opposition: Less than 15% =1; 15%-32%= 2; and with more than 33% seats= 3. 
            - Ethnicity: Ethnic majority= 1; and no majority= 2.  
            - Corruption: 0-4= 1; 5-7= 2; and 8-10= 3. 
            - Wages: over 30%= 1; 15%- 30% =2; and less than 15%= 3. 
I will assign every nation points based on this scale. The range of scores is 5 – 14 with low scores 
of 5-8 representing non distributive power structure (largely patron client structure), 9-11 
representing partial power distribution, and 12-14 representing well distributed power in the 
society. 
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Democracy   The following is the criteria used to calculate a democracy score for each nation: 
Variable 1. Election:  Pseudo democracy =1 and democracy= 3. 
                           2. Seats: 65% and above= 1; 50-65%=2; less than 50%= 3. 
                           3. Exconst: 1-2 = 1; 3-5= 2; and 6 -7= 3.  
                           4. Prevote: 60% and less = 1; 60-80%= 2; and more than 80%=3. 
                           5. Polrights: If a country receives a 7 score (least free) = 1; 6 = 2; 3 -5=   
                                               3; 2= 4; and 1 = 5.  
                           6. Crights: Same criterion as above. 
                           7. Econfree: If a country scores 5 (least free) we assign 1; 4 =2; 3= 3; 2=  
                                               4; and 1= 5.  
                           8. Women:  less than 20% women members = 1; 20-30%= 2; 30-40%=3;  
                                              40-50%= 4; and over 50%= 5. 
                 To obtain the final score, we add up the scores of each of the variables (highest 
possible score is 3+3+3+3+5+5+5+5= 32). Therefore the higher the overall score a country 
obtains, the more democratic it is deemed to be. It is important to note that the variables that 
represent legal values are weighted more heavily than those that represent institutional values. 
This is because democracy should be considered as a way of life rather than merely a system of 
governance. Secondly this enables us to escape the criticism by Van de Walle (2002:4) that 
outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear 
distinction between the public and the private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order 
but does not fully embrace liberal democracy in its actions.    
      I will also rank the countries based on the final score using the divisions adopted by the 
Freedom House. In this case countries that score;  
DUMMY VARIABLES  
Anglo Anglo=1 
           Others= 0 
Franco Franco= 1 
            Others= 0 
 The justification is that colonialism had an effect on the nature of governance in the ex-
colonies. It emphasizes the role of historical transformation.  
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Dummy variable for each region.  Gleditsch (3) argues that what happens in a region affects 
what happens in a country over and above what happens in the domestic politics of a country. 
This variable examines this relationship.  
4.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
      The analysis techniques applicable in this study are Regression Analysis and Pearson 
Correlation Coefficients; both conducted utilizing the SPSS software package. I will also make 
general observations about the state of democracy and economic development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Therefore the study will include both statistical analysis and descriptive analysis. 
Data presentation will be in the form of tables, graphs (scatter plots) and regression tables. 
 
5. DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 STATE OF DEMOCRACY 
As earlier stated I developed a scale to measure the level of democracy which ranges from 8 to 
33, 12 representing the least liberal democratic state and 33 the most liberal democratic.  The 
scale includes Accountability (election), Representation (percent of seats for the largest party), 
Constraint, and Participation (Presidential vote turnout) all representing institutional values, and 
Political Rights, Civil Rights, Property Rights (Economic freedom) and Minority Rights ( percent 
women parliamentarians ) representing legal values. In the Correlation Matrix (Table 5.1.1), we 
can observe that presidential vote (0.154), and seats (-.192) are the only variables that are not 
significantly correlated to the democratic scale. These two variables are related to elections, and 
these results concur with Arat’s argument that participation in elections does not reflect a lot 
about the state democracy in a nation. Various scholars including Carothers, Van De Walle have 
argued that elections are a farce with nations holding elections which do not observe democratic 
principles like free and fair elections. Thus the use of statistics about elections that does not 
reflect the observance of people’s real choices is not adequate. For the purpose of using 
Forewaker’s scale, I decided to use these two measures but observe that they may not be 
adequate. Thus a challenge is to develop a scale that measures both participation especially in the 
civil society and representation.  
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The other measures are significantly correlated to the democracy variable with extremely high 
correlations. Election has a correlation of 0.726, constraint (0.802), political rights (-0.889), civil 
rights (-0.839), economic freedom (-0.706) and women (0.554). It is important to note that the 
correlations of political rights, civil rights and economic freedom are shown as negatives but they 
are actually positive correlations because the measure of these variables is reverse whereby a 
lower score in these variables represents a higher score in the democracy scale. 
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TABLE 5.1.1 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY 
  
    election seats const prevote polright hrights econfree women democrat 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.368 .663(**) -.303 
-
.671(**) 
-.560(*) -.393 .019 .726(**) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
. .110 .001 .194 .001 .010 .086 .936 .000 
election 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation -.368 1 -.233 .465(*) -.006 -.136 -.229 .072 -.192 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.110 . .323 .039 .980 .568 .332 .762 .418 
seats 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation .663(**) -.233 1 -.086 
-
.723(**) 
-
.628(**) 
-.658(**) .177 .802(**) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .323 . .719 .000 .003 .002 .455 .000 
const 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation -.303 .465(*) -.086 1 -.220 -.284 -.233 .327 .154 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.194 .039 .719 . .352 .224 .323 .159 .516 
prevote 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-
.671(**) 
-.006 
-
.723(**) 
-.220 1 .916(**) .657(**) -.391 -.889(**) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .980 .000 .352 . .000 .002 .089 .000 
polright 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation -.560(*) -.136 
-
.628(**) 
-.284 .916(**) 1 .735(**) 
-
.452(*) 
-.839(**) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.010 .568 .003 .224 .000 . .000 .045 .000 
hrights 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation -.393 -.229 
-
.658(**) 
-.233 .657(**) .735(**) 1 -.442 -.706(**) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.086 .332 .002 .323 .002 .000 . .051 .000 
econfree 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation .019 .072 .177 .327 -.391 -.452(*) -.442 1 .554(*) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.936 .762 .455 .159 .089 .045 .051 . .011 
women 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Pearson 
Correlation .726(**) -.192 .802(**) .154 
-
.889(**) 
-
.839(**) 
-.706(**) .554(*) 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .418 .000 .516 .000 .000 .000 .011 . 
democrat 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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THE DEMOCRACY SCORES 
In the scale to measure democracy, we have ranked nations based on Freedom House’s system of 
ranking (www.freedomhouse.org).  
TABLE 5.1.2; RANKING OF DEMOCRACY SCORES  
RANK SCORE DESCRIPTION 
1 30-33 Liberal democracy where all 8 values are upheld 
2 26-29 Liberal democratic but some values are not 
highly upheld 
3 22-25 Somewhat democratic and enjoy some elements 
of the 8 values.  
4 18-21 Like 3 above though the values are less enjoyed 
5 14-17 Strong clienlaltist tendencies still manifest but 
allow manifestations of the eight values 
6  11-13 Like 5 above though less manifestation of the 8 
values 
7 8- 10 Not democratic; the 8 values are not respected. 
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CHART 5.1.1: BAR GRAPH FOR COUNTRIES  
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      Graphically, we see that the range of democracy scores is 12-26 with a mean of 18.5 and a 
median of 20. Based on the scale we can infer that the Sub-Saharan African countries are 
generally somewhat democratic though there are curtailments to some rights. The range of scores 
seems to concur with Carothers’ assertion that most countries fall somewhere between outright 
dictatorship and liberal democracy: ‘illiberal democracies’. Therefore we can infer that most 
nations are thus ‘somewhat free’ and also we can observe that the nations vary in their scale from 
outright dictatorship to free democracies. Republic of South Africa (26) and Botswana (23) have 
the highest scores while Cameroon (12) and Zimbabwe (13) have the lowest scores. These scores 
are generally similar to the political rights and civil rights scores assigned to African Nations in 
the Freedom House scale.  
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         The results illustrate a worse picture than Larry Diamond’s estimation that, “only about a 
third of the 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently free, fair, and competitive to meet the 
standard of democracy, and that only 5 of these are actual liberal democracies” (Joseph 2003:1). 
From the results and table 5.1.1, we can state that only the Republic of South Africa can be 
categorized as liberal democracy but Botswana, Mauritius and Mozambique can be categorized as 
somewhat liberal democracies. Of the 20 nations, 7 are in the 18-21 category that signifies trends 
towards liberal democracy but the eight core values are not highly upheld. Thus from the results, I 
concur with  Richard Joseph, Larry Diamond, Carothers and Van de Walle’s assertion that most 
Sub Saharan African nations are “illiberal democracies”. In my assessment, the nations illustrate 
traces of democratic principles but do not uphold these institutions to allow the growth of liberal 
democracy. 
  
5.2 SOCIO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
      In this section, I consider the arguments of the modernization theory. I tested specific 
hypotheses with all the variables of the theory against the measure of democracy in the nations. 
The specific hypotheses are listed below. 
     i) Relationship between Democracy and Unemployment 
According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant negative relationship between the level 
of democracy and unemployment. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between the level of democracy and unemployment. The relevant f statistic is 0.045 with a 
significance of 0.836. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no relationship between level of democracy and 
unemployment. When I observe the Pearson’s coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not 
significant (-0.056). Though it is negative, as expected, the relationship is not significant and 
therefore unemployment does not appear to significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub 
Saharan Africa.  
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      ii) Relationship between Democracy and Life Expectancy 
According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between 
democracy and life expectancy (which reflects a generally healthy population). I am testing the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and life expectancy. The relevant 
f statistic is 0.410 with a significance of 0.530. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no relationship between the 
level of democracy and life expectancy. When I observe the Pearson’s coefficient (Table 5.2.1), 
the relationship is not significant (0.149). Though it is positive, as expected, the relationship is 
not significant and therefore life expectancy does not significantly influence the state of 
democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.  
      iii) Relationship between Democracy and Urbanization 
According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between the level 
of democracy and urbanization. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between the level of democracy and urbanization. The relevant f statistic is 0.069 with a 
significance of 0.796. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore there seems to be no significant relationship between the level of 
democracy and urbanization. When I observe the Pearson’s coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the 
relationship is not significant (-0.062). The results are surprising because we expect a positive 
relationship but it is negative in this case. The relationship is not significant and therefore 
urbanization does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.  
iv) Relationship between Democracy and Education 
According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between the level 
of democracy and education. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
the level of democracy and education. The relevant f statistic is 0.511 with a significance of 
0.847. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore there seems to be no significant relationship between the level of democracy and 
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education. When I observe the Pearson’s coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not 
significant (0.209). Though it is positive, as expected, the relationship is not significant and 
therefore education does not significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.  
v) Relationship between Democracy and Technology 
According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between 
democracy and technology. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
democracy and technology. The relevant f statistic is 3.285 with a significance of 0.087. Since it 
is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there 
seems to be no relationship between democracy and technology. When I observe the Pearson’s 
coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is not significant (0.393). Though it is positive, as 
expected, the relationship is not significant and therefore technology does not significantly 
influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.  
vi) Relationship between Democracy and Economic Development 
According to this theory, I expect there to be a significant positive relationship between 
democracy and Economic Development. I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between democracy and economic development. The relevant f statistic is 6.560 with 
a significance of 0.020. Since it is below 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore a 
significant relationship between democracy and economic development exists. When I observe 
the Pearson’s coefficient (Table 5.2.1), the relationship is significant (0.517). The relationship is 
positive as expected and is relatively strong. Therefore economic development as measured by 
per capita income significantly influences the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.  
       An interesting observation from the correlation matrix is that economic development is 
significantly related to the other aspects of social development (urbanization (0.495), life 
expectancy (0.626), education (0.700) and technology (0.925). It is however not significantly 
related to unemployment (-0.043) which is a surprising result. Thus while the other variables of 
the modernization theory may not be significant influencers on the state of democracy, economic 
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development which is highly correlated to them is significantly related to the state of democracy. 
Technology is moderately correlated to the level of democracy and highly correlated to economic 
development. Thus, modernization theory may not explain the evolution of democracy in Sub 
Saharan Africa, as asserted by Arat, Landmann among other scholars, it is useful in explaining 
why some nations are more liberal democratic than others. From this assessment, the richer 
nations have more resources to allocate among the population hence less competition for the 
scarce resources which leads to a more democratic society. Therefore I concur with Arat’s 
observation about Lipset’s argument that economic development is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the establishment and/ or maintenance of a democratic political system. 
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Table 5.2.1:  CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   econdev lifeexp urban educ unemploy tech democrat 
econdev Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .626(**) .495(*) .700(**) -.043 .925(**) .517(*) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) . .003 .027 .001 .874 .000 .020 
  N 20 20 20 20 16 20 20 
lifeexp Pearson 
Correlation 
.626(**) 1 .361 .316 -.488 .686(**) .149 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .003 . .118 .174 .055 .001 .530 
  N 20 20 20 20 16 20 20 
urban Pearson 
Correlation 
.495(*) .361 1 .478(*) .003 .618(**) -.062 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .118 . .033 .991 .004 .796 
  N 20 20 20 20 16 20 20 
educ Pearson 
Correlation 
.700(**) .316 .478(*) 1 .288 .617(**) .209 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .174 .033 . .280 .004 .376 
  N 20 20 20 20 16 20 20 
unemploy Pearson 
Correlation 
-.043 -.488 .003 .288 1 -.098 -.056 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .874 .055 .991 .280 . .718 .836 
  N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
tech Pearson 
Correlation 
.925(**) .686(**) .618(**) .617(**) -.098 1 .393 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .004 .004 .718 . .087 
  N 20 20 20 20 16 20 20 
democrat Pearson 
Correlation 
.517(*) .149 -.062 .209 -.056 .393 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .530 .796 .376 .836 .087 . 
 N 20 20 20 20 16 20 20 
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CHART 5.2.1 SCATTERPLOT FOR DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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5.3 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
Relationship between Political Behavior and Democracy 
      As earlier stated, political behavior variable is composed of five variables: pressure, smooth, 
corruption, political terror, and press freedom. The ranking of the calculated total is displayed on 
Table 5.3.1. 
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TABLE 5.3.1 RANKING OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR SCORE 
Rank Scores Description 
1 13 - 15 Accommodative Behavior 
2 9 - 12 Partially Accommodative Behavior 
3 5 - 8 Little/ no accommodative Behavior 
  
 
 In the ranking scale, accommodative behavior reflects political players who accept divergent 
political views in the society and are ready to compromise and reach a middle ground on the 
choices i.e. legislation and policies that a country pursues. Partially accommodative behavior 
reflects political players who allow different views in the society as long as they do not feel 
threatened by the political process. If there are movements or ideas that the political elites feel are 
subversive to their interests then they may use unorthodox means to undermine their opponents. 
No accommodative behavior reflects societies where the political elites do not allow for different 
political views in the society. 
       Reviewing the statistics on Table 5.3.2, we observe that the mean score is 9.35 (partially 
accommodative behavior). The median score is 9.0 while the mode is 11, these scores fall within 
the category of partially accommodative political behavior. Thus we can infer that, on average, 
Sub Saharan African political elites partially accommodate different political opinions and 
interests. This may explain the lack of well established liberal democratic societies whereby the 
political system accommodates different opinions, interests, and activities. As stated in the 
literature review, Lipset defined democracy as a social mechanism for the resolution of the 
problem of societal decision making which permits the largest possible part of the population to 
influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political 
office. By not accommodating different views, political elites in the region subvert to a large 
extent the consolidation of democracy in the region.  
        Graph 5.3.3 illustrates the distribution of behavior scores for the various countries in the 
sample. From the graph we can observe that only Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa scored 
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12 points and above to be described as having political elites who have accommodative behavior. 
On the other end of the spectrum, 8 countries (Cameron, Ethiopia, Cote de Iviore, Gabon, 
Gambia, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) scored 8 points or less. This indicates that tolerance for 
divergent political opinions is not well respected by elites in many Sub Saharan African 
countries. 9 countries are in the partial accommodative category of which Senegal, Seychelles, 
Mozambique, and Mali scored relatively high scores. The rest were barely above the 8 threshold 
hence relatively low mean and median scores of 9.35 and 9.0 respectively. 
GRAPH 5.3.3 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR SCORES BY COUNTRY 
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       In reviewing the power variable (Table 5.3.4), we can observe that all variables that 
constitute the political behavior variable are significantly correlated (at 0.01 level) to the 
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composite variable. Press Freedom has the strongest correlation at -0.864, followed by Pressure 
0.833, Corruption (0.779), Smooth 0.740, and finally Political Terror -0.724. Thus the variables 
and scores used in this study to measure the behavior of the political elites (agents) in a society 
are acceptable and may reflect how political agents react to different political views, opinions and 
interests within the society and allow these freedoms to be pursued without interference by the 
political agents. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.3.4 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR VARIABLE 
 Correlations 
 
    polbeh pressure smooth press pterror corupt 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .833(**) .740(**) -.864(**) -.724(**) .779(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
polbeh 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.833(**) 1 .725(**) -.655(**) -.491(*) .498(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .002 .028 .036 
pressure 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.740(**) .725(**) 1 -.600(**) -.651(**) .518(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .005 .002 .028 
smooth 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.864(**) -.655(**) -.600(**) 1 .600(**) -.697(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .005 . .005 .001 
press 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.724(**) -.491(*) -.651(**) .600(**) 1 -.610(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .028 .002 .005 . .007 
pterror 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.779(**) .498(*) .518(*) -.697(**) -.610(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .036 .028 .001 .007 . 
corupt 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
    
 
 
I am testing the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the level of democracy and 
political behavior. The relevant f statistic is 7.597 with a significance of 0.001. Since it is well 
below 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there is a significant relationship 
between democracy and political behavior. When I observe the Pearson’s coefficient (Table 
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5.2.5), the relationship is significant (0.818). The relationship is very positive as expected and is 
also very strong. Therefore, political behavior as measured by pressure, smooth transition, 
political terror, free media and corruption significantly influences the state of democracy in Sub 
Saharan Africa.  
       When we observe Table 5.2.5 which is the Correlation Matrix for democracy and the 
variables that constitute political behavior, all variables are significantly related to democracy. 
Corruption has a Pearson’s coefficient of 0.737 (significance of less than 0.001); Pressure 0.595 
(0.006); Smooth Transition 0.627 (0.03); Free Media -0.745 (less than 0.001; and Political Terror 
-0.609 (less than 0.001).  
In interpreting these scores we consider the points assigned to the various variables. In the cases 
of corruption, press freedom and political terror, the positive and negative relationships should be 
interpreted in reverse of what they indicate.  
 • In the case of corruption, the more corrupt nations were assigned lower scores while 
the clean nations were assigned higher scores. Therefore a positive relationship indicates 
that the cleaner a nation, the more democratic it is.  
• Free Press: A country scored lower points if it allowed a free media while those that do 
not respect press freedom were assigned more points. Therefore a negative relationship 
indicates that the more a nation allows a free press, the more democratic it is.  
• Political Terror: A country scored lower points if there is less political terror in the 
country while countries where terror is extended to the whole population were assigned 
higher scores. Therefore a negative relationship indicates that the more a nation does not 
allow political terror the more democratic it is. 
      Thus all variables that constitute political behavior are significant influencers on the state of 
democracy. Graph 5.3.6 shows the distribution of democracy against behavior scores for the 
countries in the sample. We can observe that there is a positive linear relationship between 
democracy and political behavior: the more a country’s political elites have accommodative 
behavior traits, the more democratic the country is. Thus, Political Agent theory  especially as 
constitutes political behavior may significantly address the evolution of democracy in Sub 
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Saharan Africa, and it is useful in explaining why some nations are more liberal democratic than 
others.  
TABLE 5.3.5 CORRELATIONS MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
    polbeh pressure smooth press pterror corupt democrat 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .833(**) .740(**) -.864(**) -.724(**) .779(**) .818(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
polbeh 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.833(**) 1 .725(**) -.655(**) -.491(*) .498(*) .595(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .002 .028 .036 .006 
pressure 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.740(**) .725(**) 1 -.600(**) -.651(**) .518(*) .627(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .005 .002 .028 .003 
smooth 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.864(**) -.655(**) -.600(**) 1 .600(**) -.697(**) -.745(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .005 . .005 .001 .000 
press 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.724(**) -.491(*) -.651(**) .600(**) 1 -.610(**) -.609(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .028 .002 .005 . .007 .004 
pterror 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.779(**) .498(*) .518(*) -.697(**) -.610(**) 1 .737(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .036 .028 .001 .007 . .000 
corupt 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.818(**) .595(**) .627(**) -.745(**) -.609(**) .737(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .003 .000 .004 .000 . 
democrat 
N 20 20 20 20 20 18 20 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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GRAPH 5.3.6 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
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5.4 POWER STRUCTURE 
II) Relationship between Democracy and Power Structure 
      As earlier stated, power structure variable is composed of five variables: wealth equality, 
ethnicity, opposition, public sector wages, and corruption. The ranking of the calculated total is 
displayed on Table 5.4.1. 
TABLE 5.4.1 RANKING OF POWER STRUCTURE SCORE 
Rank Scores Description 
1 12 - 14 Well Distributed Power Structure 
2 9 - 12 Partially distributed  
3 5 - 8 Little/ no power distribution 
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      Reviewing the statistics on Table 5.4.1, we observe that the mean score is 8.95 (partially 
distributed). The median score is 9 and mode is 8. Therefore we can observe that most of the 
nations have a partially distributive power structure which accommodates some political agents 
but omits a large number too. The scores of the various countries can be viewed on Table 5.4.2. 
With the exception of Ethiopia and Gambia, all other countries scored between 8 and 11. Thus 
nearly all the countries in the sample have a partially distributed power structure. This is in line 
with Van De Walle’ assertion that most Sub Saharan African countries have most of the trappings 
of a rational legal bureaucracy but this is not done practically. 
GRAPH 5.4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRIES 
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       In reviewing the power variable (Table 5.4.3), we can observe that only ethnicity 
(0.699) and wages -0.489) are significantly related (at 0.05 level) to power. The other 
variables, wealth (-0.06), opposition (0.373) and corruption (-0.33) are not significantly 
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correlated though opposition and corruption are moderately correlated. Thus the variables 
used in this study to measure the distribution of power in a society may not be conclusive 
and further investigation is appropriate in this case. 
TABLE 5.4.3 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR POWER VARIABLE 
 
    power wealth opposit ethnic corupt wages 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.060 .373 .699(**) -.033 -.489(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .818 .105 .001 .896 .029 
power 
N 20 17    20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.060 1 .073 -.187 .627(**) .155 
Sig. (2-tailed) .818 . .782 .472 .007 .553 
wealth 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.373 .073 1 -.094 -.025 .052 
Sig. (2-tailed) .105 .782 . .693 .923 .827 
opposit 
N 20 17 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.699(**) -.187 -.094 1 -.402 -.379 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .472 .693 . .098 .099 
ethnic 
N 20 17 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.033 .627(**) -.025 -.402 1 .367 
Sig. (2-tailed) .896 .007 .923 .098 . .135 
corupt 
N 18 17 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.489(*) .155 .052 -.379 .367 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .553 .827 .099 .135 . 
wages 
N 20 17 20 20 18 20 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
With regard to the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between democracy and power 
structure, the relevant f statistic is 0.560 with a significance of 0.729. Since it is above 0.05, we 
do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore there seems not to be a 
significant relationship between democracy and power structure. When I observe the Pearson’s 
coefficient (Table 5.4.4), the relationship is not significant (0.381) though moderately strong and 
positive as expected.  
       With reference to Table 5.4.4 which is the correlation matrix for democracy and the variables 
that constitute power structure, only corruption is significantly related to democracy. Corruption 
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has a Pearson’s coefficient of 0.737 (significance of less than 0.001); Wealth 0.296 (0.250); 
Opposition Parties 0.192 (0.418); Ethnicity -0.27 (0.910); and Public Sector wages 0.136 (0.567). 
Graph 5.4.5 illustrates that there may be a general linear relationship between democracy and 
power structure but there are many outliers. Therefore power structure as measured by wealth 
equality, ethnicity, public sector wages, opposition parties and corruption does not significantly 
influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan Africa.  
TABLE 5.4.4 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND POWER 
 
 Correlations                           
 
    democrat power wealth opposit ethnic corupt wages 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .381 .296 .192 -.027 .737(**) .136 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .098 .250 .418 .910 .000 .567 
democrat 
N 20 20 17 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.381 1 -.060 .373 .699(**) -.033 -.489(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .098 . .818 .105 .001 .896 .029 
power 
N 20 20 17 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.296 -.060 1 .073 -.187 .627(**) .155 
Sig. (2-tailed) .250 .818 . .782 .472 .007 .553 
wealth 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.192 .373 .073 1 -.094 -.025 .052 
Sig. (2-tailed) .418 .105 .782 . .693 .923 .827 
opposit 
N 20 20 17 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.027 .699(**) -.187 -.094 1 -.402 -.379 
Sig. (2-tailed) .910 .001 .472 .693 . .098 .099 
ethnic 
N 20 20 17 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.737(**) -.033 .627(**) -.025 -.402 1 .367 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .896 .007 .923 .098 . .135 
corupt 
N 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.136 -.489(*) .155 .052 -.379 .367 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .567 .029 .553 .827 .099 .135 . 
wages 
N 20 20 17 20 20 18 20 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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 GRAPH 5.4.5 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST POWER STRUCTURE 
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5.5 CORRUPTION 
In this study, I have utilized Transparency’s scale for corruption in the world. In the scale, 0 
represents highly corrupted nations while 10 represents highly clean nations. Transparency 
International Perception index applies a definition of corruption as misuse of public power for 
private benefit, for example, bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, and 
embezzlement of public funds, as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts.  The 
mean score is 2.97 with a median of 2.55 and mode of 2.5. We can therefore infer that most Sub 
Saharan African nations are highly corrupt because a median of 2.55 reflects a relatively low 
score in the scale. Graph 5.5.1 illustrates the scores for each of the countries in the sample. 
Botswana is the least corrupt while Nigeria is the most corrupt. Botswana in fact is the only 
nation that scores over half the score. Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa are relatively clean as 
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compared to the rest of the nations. Nigeria followed by Cameron, and Kenya, are the most 
corrupt scoring less than 2 points. The rest of the countries scored between 2 and about 3.3. 
Therefore we can infer that generally African nations are highly corrupt.  
 
GRAPH 5.5.1 CORRUPTION SCORES BY COUNTRIES 
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In testing the relationship between level of democracy and corruption, the relevant f statistic is 
19.038 with a significance of less than 0.001. Since it is below 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore there is a relationship between democracy and corruption. When I observe the 
Pearson’s coefficient (Table 5.5.2), the relationship is significant (less than 0.001) and very 
strong (0.737). Though it is positive, as earlier discussed it should be interpreted as a negative 
relationship because in the ranking system, the less corrupt countries received lower scores. 
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Graph 5.5.3 illustrates the distribution of corruption scores among the various countries. We can 
observe that the relationship is generally linear with Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa as the 
outliers. Therefore, the less corrupt a country is, the more democratic it tends to be. We can 
therefore state that corruption does significantly influence the state of democracy in Sub Saharan 
Africa.  
 
TABLE 5.5.2 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION 
Correlations
1 .737**
. .000
20 18
.737** 1
.000 .
18 18
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
democrat
corupt
democrat corupt
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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GRAPH 5.5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST CORRUPTION 
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5.6 LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 
       After reviewing the various variables, we have arrived at economic development, political 
behavior and corruption as the most influential variables influencing the state of democracy in 
Sub Saharan Africa. Table 5.6.1 is a correlation matrix for the variables. It is interesting to 
observe that all variables are significantly correlated to each other. As earlier noted they are all 
correlated to democracy. Amongst them the correlation is also significant: Economic 
development has a strong significant (less than 0.001) negative relationship with corruption 
(0.828), and positive relationship with Political behavior (0.603 with a significance of 0.05). 
Corruption has a strong and negative relationship with Political behavior (0.779 with a 
significance of less than 0.001).  
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TABLE 5.6.1 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INFLENTIAL VARIABLES AND DEMOCRACY 
 
    democrat polbeh corupt econdev 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .818(**) .737(**) .517(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .020 
democrat 
N 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.818(**) 1 .779(**) .603(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .005 
polbeh 
N 20 20 18 20 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.737(**) .779(**) 1 .828(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 
corupt 
N 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.517(*) .603(**) .828(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .005 .000 . 
econdev 
N 20 20 18 20 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
      Thus the aim of this section is to analyze how these variables influence the state of 
democracy in the region. I conducted a linear regression analysis to determine the relevance of 
these variables in explaining the state of democracy. To accomplish this, I performed tests to 
ensure that all variables met the assumptions before running the regression analysis. The 
distribution of the dependent variable is normal and has the same variance for all values of the 
independent variables. The linearity of the variables was also tested and independence of 
observations was met. To achieve this I took the natural log for economic development. Graph 
5.6.2 illustrates a scatterplot matrix for all variables used in the regression model. We may 
observe that there is a linear relationship amongst the variables. 
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5.6.2 SCATTERPLOT MATRIX FOR ALL VARIABLES 
 
 
5.6.3 REGRESSION MODEL 
  
 
  
 
Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .844(a) .712 .651 2.2208 
a  Predictors: (Constant), LNecondev, polbeh, corupt 
 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
170.953 3 56.984 11.554 .000(a) 
Residual 69.047 14 4.932     
1 
Total 240.000 17       
a  Predictors: (Constant), LNecondev, polbeh, corupt 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
democrat polbeh corupt LNecondev
LNecondev 
corupt 
pol beh 
democrat 
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 Coefficients(a) 
 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 10.791 5.900   1.829 .089 
  polbeh .917 .347 .615 2.644 .019 
  corupt 1.264 1.088 .382 1.161 .265 
  LNecondev -.593 .971 -.153 -.611 .551 
a  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
Three null hypotheses were tested, specifically, that there is no linear relationship between 
democracy and the group of independent variables, that the population partial regression 
coefficients are 0, and that the population value for multiple R square is 0. 
The relevant statistic is the f statistic which tests all null hypotheses simultaneously. The multiple 
R is 0.844 and the multiple R square is 0.712. The f statistic is 11.554 which is large. The 
probability of getting this statistic or larger when the null hypotheses are true is less than 0.005. 
Since it is below 0.05, we reject the null hypotheses. At least one of the population regression 
coefficients is not 0. Therefore the correlation coefficient (multiple R) is 0.844 and 71.2% 
variability in democracy is explained by the group of independent variables.   The sample size is 
18 and the mean natural logarithm of economic development is 7.4779. The slope for economic 
development is -0.593 with a standard error of 0.971. The t statistic is -0.611 with a significance 
level of 0.265. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that the slope is 0 for corruption controlling for the other variables in the model. 
The mean score for corruption is 2.97 with a slope of 1.264 and a standard error of 1.088. The t 
statistic is 1.161 with a significance level of 0.265. Since it is above 0.05, we do not have 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the slope is 0 for corruption controlling for 
the other variables in the model.  
The mean score for political behavior is 9.33 with a slope of 0.917 and a standard error of 0.347. 
The t statistic is 2.644 with a significance level of 0.019. Since it is below 0.05, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the slope is 0 for political behavior controlling for the other variables in the 
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model. Thus political behavior has a positive relationship with democracy in the model. 
Therefore the more accommodative the political behavior, the more democratic a country is. 
There is a 0.917 change in democracy for every one unit change in political behavior. Political 
behavior (beta value of 0.615) is the most important variable contributing to the explanation of 
variance in the dependent variable (democracy). 
6. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
• That the state of democracy in Sub Sahara Africa is between outright dictatorship and liberal 
democracy. This concurs with the general assertion that African countries are more or less 
‘illiberal democracies. In my opinion, these nations illustrate traces of democratic principles but 
do not uphold these institutions to allow the growth of liberal democracy especially they score 
relatively low scores in civil rights, political rights and economic freedom. Thus as Van De Walle 
asserts outwardly the state has all the trappings of a Weberian rational-legal system, with a clear 
distinction between the public and private realm, with written laws and a constitutional order but 
in practice these institutions are not highly upheld. 
• However the above assertion should not tempt us to underrate the gains realized over the past 
decade. The are obvious imperfections especially with the day-to-day politics which fall short of 
the democratic ideals but today, the region is better on this matter than in the late 1980s. We 
should also consider the fact that these young democracies are measured to strict standards of 
liberal democracies which even the mature Western democracies cannot meet consistently. 
• I support Arat and Landmann’s assertion that we cannot casually link economic development 
and democracy while ignoring the complex intervening political factors especially in Third World 
nations. They tested this hypothesis on Latin America, and they observations were supported by 
Acuna-Alfaro who conducted a study on democracy in Central America. 
 • Economic development, while having a significant relationship with democracy, does not 
contribute in the regression. My assertion here is that while more economically developed 
countries display more democratic tendencies, it doesn’t alter much about the state of democracy 
 72
in the particular nations. My contention is that since the particular country has more resources to 
distribute, the political elite do not feel threatened because there are a lot more resources to 
distribute to the population to ensure that there is no prominent challenge to the status quo. In less 
developed countries, the political elites are forced to use more coercive measures to ensure that 
the population is not a threat to the status quo. However, there is a counter argument that argues 
that there is oppression even in richer countries, for example Nigeria, Angola and Guinea Bissau 
which are endowed with enormous natural resources including oil reserves. Thus economic 
development does not affect the underlying patron client structure, rather feeds this system such 
that there is less opposition to the political elites. Economic development is thus a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the transition and consolidation of democracy in the region. 
•I agree with Van De Walle that the new democratic governments face exceptionally strong 
distributive pressures both from groups entering the political arena and the established interests, 
which may influence the political leaders not to fully embrace the principles of democracy in 
order to sustain power. Thus their rational calculations may suggest to them that partial 
acceptance to the democratic game is the best alternative. This may explain why the scores for 
political behavior are predominantly partial behavior (mean score 9.35). In Armijo’s assertion 
that the problem lies between the second and third stage, that is, the internalization and normative 
acceptance of the new democratic procedures by all the major political players. Thus the biggest 
barrier to further progress may well be executive dominance (Van De Walle b 2002:74) 
•Political behavior as the main predictor also serves an interesting dimension. The patron client 
system may not be the fundamental problem. The problem lies within the greed and self interest 
by the elites. As showed in the US presidential elections in 2000, political patronage practices 
occur even within the most advanced democracies in the world. Therefore, client networks are not 
really the problem. The problem and difference with the advanced democracies lies in the fact 
that the elites in Sub Sahara Africa use the state as a means to enrich themselves and are 
unrestrained, while in the West their use of the political process to protect their interests and those 
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of their sponsors is restrained. Thus the boundaries for these patronage practices must be 
tightened in the region. 
• If we consider the corruption scores, we can observe that the region is relatively very corrupt. 
This is one area that has to be confronted. It has a high correlation with the level of democracy 
and political behavior. Corruption highly influences the behavior of the political elites and the 
attitudes of the population who expect their people in positions of power to appropriate resources 
to them by virtue of their status in the government. Thus any gains on consolidating democracy in 
the region must include measures to combat corruption. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
LIMITATIONS 
One limitation in this study is that the conclusions are based on regression analyses at a single 
time point (Arat 1988:23). Utilizing a time series design may be more appropriate because 
investigating changes over a period of time is much more effective. That could be a future 
research project that I may undertake. Secondly, the definition of transition to democracy utilized 
in this study may be considered as timeless; a country may forever be considered to be in 
transition. Finally, since the data collected is based on secondary sources, all weaknesses that 
may be highlighted about the data sources are by extension applicable in this study. We have 
however carefully considered the sources of the data to include only those sources that justify the 
research methodology utilized in their research. I also considered data sources that have been 
utilized by scholars who have published articles in peer-reviewed journals. The sample size is 
relatively small which may affect the results of the statistical analysis. Thus, the high correlations 
displayed and also multiple R square in the regression model is affected by the sample size. 
However this size was necessary because many countries did not fit our criteria and also the 
number of nations is not large. Thus dealing with nation states in particular regions of the world 
will affect the sample size. This is a disadvantage that must be accepted if such analyses are to be 
conducted. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
       The empirically supported regularities can be used to ease the transition to democratic rule in 
the countries that are still generally authoritarian and help the rest to consolidate their democratic 
advances. The results may also reduce the probability of civil conflicts by enhancing the 
probability of a country maintaining democratic practices.  
        It may be useful to link some types of foreign assistance to political and economic 
liberalization. However we should not heavily rely on the Western donors because as Van de 
Walle (b,2002,74)  argues, the donors tend to favor incumbents whom their funding buttresses, 
and are loath to make the kind of partisan choices promoting real change. Thus institutional 
changes should be encouraged through institutional learning. As citizens in the countries gain 
more experience from the democratic process they will learn and make more appropriate choices 
which may influence behavioral changes in the countries. Thus emphasis should be placed on 
educating the population on their political rights and choices and how they influence the policies 
and practices of the leaders. With every passing election, the fruits of democracy will be further 
developed in the countries.  
       As earlier asserted, because economic development is a necessary condition for the 
consolidation of democracy, efforts must continue to encourage economic development. If, as 
Mbaku argued, that statism and single party systems were the causes of lack of democracy and 
economic underdevelopment in the region, single political parties have been dismantled. While 
the region has gained considerably in its transition to democracy, there is still a long way to go. 
Since political behavior is the most significant predictor of the state of democracy in the region 
then my proposal is that in order to develop more accommodative behavior, statism must be 
abolished. A change in the predatory behavior, especially rent seeking motivations of the political 
elites will indicate a real transition to democracy and not remain as a way station as Carothers 
argues. This can be accomplished by allowing the private sector to develop in the region as the 
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mechanism of resource allocation. In this case, the central role of the state and especially the 
President in the resource allocation of resources will be greatly diminished and therefore reduce 
the parochial interests of the political elites in seeking favors from the incumbent.  
       However, this proposal will definitely meet opposition from the political elites who as 
observed have benefited from the patron client system sustained by statism. In order to change 
this, political elites have to have sufficient reasons to make rational calculations that liberal 
democracy is beneficial to them. This will entail compromises that may not be attractive to 
citizens in the region. My proposal is that these nations should privatize the state corporations 
while allowing the elites to buy these corporations.  
       This proposal has a two fold impact: By transferring resources to private hands, the state will 
not play a significant role in resource allocation. Therefore the state will not face intense demands 
from the various interest parties to distribute the scarce resources especially with the increased 
pressure from the inclusion of earlier displaced groups into the political process. This added 
pressure, scholars have argued. May undercut the democratic gains already achieved.  Secondly, 
this will lead to the creation of business elite that is separate from the political elites unlike in the 
current set up. The business elites will therefore have vested interests to ensure that the state 
pursues sound economic policies that ensure continued business opportunities and also political 
policies that ensure stability in the country for long term development of their business 
enterprises. Thus policy failures will represent a major threat to the political survival of the 
leadership as opposed to the current setup as de Mesquita et al argue (pg 14). This will also allow 
the population to clearly differentiate public from private issues hence exact accountability from 
the political leaders, as Makinda (1996:557) asserts. Since state led development has proved not 
to be successful then private sector development should be embraced. As asserted in the 
modernization theory, economic development changes the behavior and attitudes of the elites. A 
private sector led economic development strategy will create new elites whose stake in the 
political process will be largely determined by the sustained economic development of the 
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country. This will best be accomplished by stability in the political process of which the 
consolidation of liberal democratic practices is the best alternative.    
        In conclusion, the behavior of the political elites in Sub Saharan politics must be tackled if 
the region is to consolidate the democratic gains they have achieved since the early 1990’s. 
Fundamentally the biggest challenge remains to change the attitudes of the political players from 
viewing politics as a ‘zero sum’ game and embrace an accommodative attitude towards politics 
especially a ‘win-win’ mentality in which all members of the society benefit from the political 
and economic process. Private sector led economic development must also be actively pursued to 
reduce the poverty levels in the region. Therefore, political and economic liberalization must be 
jointly implemented if the region is to consolidate the democratic achievements of the past 
decade. 
         Proposed further research may focus on the behavior of the political agents, for example, a 
detailed study of corrupt practices in a particular nation would be appropriate. A comparative 
case study may be conducted especially between two countries on both ends of the democratic 
ranking scale, for example Republic of South Africa and Cameroon. 
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APPENDIX 
ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .788 1 .788 .045 .836(a) 
  Residual 247.650 14 17.689     
  Total 248.438 15       
a  Predictors: (Constant), unemploy 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
 
ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
6.162 1 6.162 .410 .530(a) 
Residual 270.838 18 15.047     
1 
Total 277.000 19       
a  Predictors: (Constant), lifeexp 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
 
ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND URBANIZATION 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
1.060 1 1.060 .069 .796(a) 
Residual 275.940 18 15.330     
1 
Total 277.000 19       
a  Predictors: (Constant), urban 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 
  
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 182.000 15 12.133 .511 .847 
Within Groups 95.000 4 23.750     
Total 277.000 19       
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ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
42.748 1 42.748 3.285 .087(a) 
Residual 234.252 18 13.014     
1 
Total 277.000 19       
a  Predictors: (Constant), tech 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
 
ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
73.988 1 73.988 6.560 .020(a) 
Residual 203.012 18 11.278     
1 
Total 277.000 19       
a  Predictors: (Constant), econdev 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
 
STATISTICS OF POWER VARIABLE 
 
power  
Valid 20 N 
Missing 0 
Mean 8.9500 
Median 9.0000 
Mode 8.00(a) 
Std. Deviation 1.39454 
25 8.0000 
50 9.0000 
Percentiles 
75 10.0000 
a  Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
democrat  
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ANOVA: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 226.000 7 32.286 7.597 .001 
Within Groups 51.000 12 4.250     
Total 277.000 19       
 
 
 
ANOVA:  DEMOCRACY AND POWER STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 46.167 5 9.233 .560 .729 
Within Groups 230.833 14 16.488     
Total 277.000 19       
 
 
 
STATISTICS OF POWER STRUCTURE VARIABLE 
 
 
Valid 20 N 
Missing 0 
Mean 8.9500 
Median 9.0000 
Mode 8.00(a) 
Std. Deviation 1.39454 
25 8.0000 
50 9.0000 
Percentiles 
75 10.0000 
a  Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
democrat  
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STATISTICS AND ANOVA OF CORRUPTION VARIABLE 
 
 Statistics 
 
corupt  
Valid 18 N 
Missing 2 
Mean 2.9722 
Median 2.5500 
Mode 2.50 
Std. Deviation 
1.13698 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
130.406 1 130.406 19.038 .000(a) 
Residual 109.594 16 6.850     
1 
Total 240.000 17       
a  Predictors: (Constant), corupt 
b  Dependent Variable: democrat 
 
 
 
STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX FOR REGRESSION MODEL 
 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
democrat 18.667 3.7573 18 
polbeh 9.3333 2.52050 18 
corupt 2.9722 1.13698 18 
LNecondev 7.4799 .97030 18 
 
 
 
 Correlations 
 
    democrat polbeh corupt LNecondev 
democrat 1.000 .826 .737 .507 
polbeh .826 1.000 .779 .568 
corupt .737 .779 1.000 .814 
Pearson 
Correlation 
LNecondev .507 .568 .814 1.000 
democrat . .000 .000 .016 
polbeh .000 . .000 .007 
corupt .000 .000 . .000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
LNecondev .016 .007 .000 . 
democrat 18 18 18 18 
polbeh 18 18 18 18 
corupt 18 18 18 18 
N 
LNecondev 18 18 18 18 
 
 
 
